Propositions and Attitudes

The readings collected in this volume investigate many different philosophical issues concerning the nature of propositions, the concept of which is important in several areas of philosophy, and central to the philosophy of language, and investigates the attitudes we bear to them. The papers reflect both the history of the topic, with classic pieces from Russell and Frege and the range of contemporary views, with modern classics from Kaplan, Perry and Kripke, and recent work from some of the leading young American philosophers.Table of ContentKnowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description, Bertrand Russell; thoughts, Gottlob Frege; selection from the Frege-Russell correspondence; a remark concerning Quine's paradox about modality, Alonzo Church; on the logic of demonstratives, David Kaplan; the problem of the essential indexical, John Perry; a puzzle about belief, Saul Kripke; synonymy and the analysis of belief sentences, Hilary Putnam; intensional isomorphism and identity of belief, Alonzo Church; direct reference and ascriptions of belief, Mark Richard; direct reference, propositional attitudes, and semantic content, Scott Soames; reflexivity, Nathan Salmon.